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VOLUME XIX NOVEABER, 1944 NUMBER 4
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
KARL M. RODMAN
It is almost axiomatic to say that any development of International
Law in the Western Hemisphere must come as a development of the
Monroe Doctrine-that all-elastic and heretofore unilateral policy of
the United States of America towards Central and South America.
This is because no major development of International Law is
possible in the Western Hemisphere without the agreement or even
leadership of the most powerful nation of that hemisphere. If the
United States is to, lead, and past and present movements indicate
this fact beyond question, its leadership has always been and is now
being expressed in terms of the "Monroe Doctrine."
I. THE 0iGnAL MONROE DOCTRINE: WHAT BECAME OF IT?
Lest one be misled into thinking that the United States by nowadays
using the Monroe Doctrine label for its Western Hemisphere foreign
policy is in fact using the same original policy of the past, it is
necessary briefly to analyze some of the attitudes that have been
taken by the United States under the shade of that old umbrella, the
Monroe Doctrine, and their result as interpreted by writers, jurists and
scholars in the light of prewar (World War H) classical International
Law. We shall find that not only has the American (U. S. A.)
attitude changed several times but also the Doctrine now purports to
assume a new internationally legal position of considerable weight
and importance.
"Mr. Tilden," says Mr. Kirby Page, "once observed that he thought
the Monroe Doctrine might be a good thing if one could only find
out just what it was."
John Hay once coupled the Monroe Doctrine with the golden rule
as cardinal elements in our foreign policy. Twenty-eight years ago
Albert Bushnell Hart pointed out that "its meaning and immediate
cogency are still uncertain and disputed." He expressed the opinion
that it is a "power of mind." Hiram Bingham says that "there are
probably no two words in American history which have been more
variously interpreted, which have meant more things to more people,
and which have been more highly praised by some and more bitterly
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condemned by others." One writer says that "the Monroe Doctrine is
a blank check on which any sum may be written by the State Depart-
ment in Washington." While Professor Hart says that "the number
of doctrines since 1849 is about the same as the number of secretaries
of state." In 1920 David Jayne Hill said that the only definite and
settled aspect of our foreign policy was the Monroe Doctrine-but
added, "whatever that may imply." An English writer has discovered
".one of the most singular ironies of history in the flat contradiction
between its primitive and present tendencies . .. ."
What are now the five points that may be detected from an intensive
reading of the original message of President Monroe?
(1) The American continents "are henceforth not to be colonized by
any European powers."
(2) Any effort to extend the European monarchical system "to any
portion of this hemisphere" would be considered as "dangerous" to our
peace and safety.'
(3) "With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European
power we have not interfered and shall not interfere."
(4) The determination of the United States not to become involved
in European controversies is proclaimed in the following words: "In
the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we
have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to
do ...Our policy in regard to Europe ...is not to interfere in the
internal concerns of any of its powers."
(5) The policy of non-intervention by the United States of America
in the affairs of other American countries was announced. "It is still
the true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves,
in the hope that other powers will pursue the same course."
But can there be any doubt that nothing remains in today's inter-
national circumstances of any of the five issues to which the original
Monroe Doctrine was directed? 2
(1) The question of future colonization of the Western Hemisphere
by European powers has long been an impossibility and a dead issue.
(2) Since the monarchical system is barely alive in Europe and not
at all in the Western Hemisphere, this issue is likewise obsolete.3
(3) As to existing colonies, the United States has in fact had cause
to interfere in Cuba, and is now interfering in certain British-West
Indies possessions-the former without the consent of the then mother
country, Spain, in violation of this point.
(4) The United States' participation in the Europeafi controversies
'However, as we shall see later, the situation in which the U. S. A.
now finds itself has caused it to deduce new applications of the Monroe
Doctrine to the totalitarian powers of Europe.
*Supra n. 1.
* 
3Supra n. 1.
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of World War I, and its present participation in World War II
virtually abandons this point.
(5) As to other American countries, in so far as the United States
meant this article as a self-prohibition on its own interference in
Central and South America, the 1920-30 expeditions to Nicaragua,
etc., have repudiated this promise.
Now this result leaves the United States in a most extraordinary
situation. We are in exactly the position in which Alice in Wonder-
land found herself when the cat had gone. The cat had gone but
the grin remained. The five points of the Monroe Doctrine have
gone, but the Monroe Doctrine is supposed to be there nevertheless.
How can that be? We profess a doctrine deprived of its original
contents. We have put other contents inside, and the Monroe Doctrine
is in name still there.
We do not need to dwell on the variety of interpretatiofis given to
the Doctrine during the past one hundred twenty years. A few
examples must suffice: President Theodore Roosevelt, with his mag-
nificent elasticity for leaping from one opinion to another, finally
suggested that under the Monroe Doctrine the United States was a
compulsory intermediary between European nations and American
nations other than the United States whenever there is a controversy
between them. Through this interpretation we have seen a growing
practice during the last twenty-five years by the European nations of
referring difficulties between them and American states to Washing-
ton, so that Washington may intervene as mediator and, if things go
awry, exert the necessary pressure.
A second interpretation connected with the foregoing, indeed in
the very words of President Theodore Roosevelt, is that the United
States of America should appear before the world as the guarantor of
the good international behavior of the other nations of the continent.
A third interpretation is the extension of the principle of self-defense
to include the whole continent. If we read, for instance, the remarks
which accompany the Senate's reservations to the Kellogg Pact of
1928 for the Renunciation of War, we shall see clearly how the Monroe
Doctrine is considered as an extension of the principle of self-defense
in such a way that it would, by the sole decision of the United
States, cover anything that happened anywhere in the American
continent provided that the United States thought fit so to consider it.
From the time of President Theodore Roosevelt up to the advent
of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his "Good Neighbor" policy,
intervening events have corroborated those interpretations *so that
by the end of that period the Monroe Doctrine could probably be
said to have meant the following:
First it meant the compulsory intermediary action of the United
1944]
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States of America between extra-American nations and other American
nations in the Western Hemisphere.
It meant, secondly, a tendency to regard the United States as the
guarantor of the good behavior of the other nations of the continent
towards nations outside the continent.
It meant, thirdly, the indefinite extension of the principle of seif-
defense to cover anything that the United States considered to be self-
defense.
Now all of these interpretations have represented an absolutely
unilateral interpretation of the Doctrine by the United States. This
has been the fundamental principle running through the Monroe
Doctrine from the very beginning under President Monroe until the
present date. It has never represented a principle accepted as
international customary law by the common understanding of several
nations.
When the League of Nations was created considerable thought was
given to the place of the Monroe Doctrine. Article 21 of the Con-
venant of the League reads as follows:
"Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the
validity of international engagements, such as treaties of
arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe
Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace."
The Monroe Doctrine was not a regional understanding. If there is
one thing which stands out clearly from every pronouncement, how-
ever differing in other contents, of every statesman, of every jurist,
of every senator, of every publicist of the United States, it was that
the Monroe Doctrine was a unilateral pronouncement of the United
States of America, and that no one but the United States government
can interpret, define or apply it.
It can clearly be seen that the outstanding feature of the Monroe
Doctrine in its relation to the general rules of International Law has
always been the unilateral character of the policy proclaimed. From
the day when President Monroe and his secretary of state, John
Quincy Adams, decided to make the declaration independently of any
parallel announcement by the British Foreign Office, the Doctrine has
always been regarded by the United States as its own peculiar property.
When Secretary Hughes stated in 1923 that "as the policy embodied
in the Monroe Doctrine is distinctively the policy of the United States,
the government of the United States reserves to itself its definition,
interpretation and application"' he was able to quote similar state-
ments of Secretary Root in 19141 and of President Wilson in 1916
in support of his position.
417 AM. J. INT. L. (1923) 611, 616.
5Address before American Society of International Law, 1914.
'Address before the Second Pan-American Scientific Congress, Jan.
6, 1916.
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II. BuT THE QUESTION MUST ARISE, WAS THE MONROE DOCTRINE
EVER RECOGNIZED BY OTHER AMERICAN STATES?
The Argentine representative in the Committee on Arbitration and
Security, having heard of Article 21 during the discussions, delivered
himself of the following pronouncement:
"It is my duty to make objections, in the name of historical
accuracy, to the wording of Article 21.
"The Monroe Doctrine mentioned in the article is a politi-
cal declaration of the United States. The policy expressed
or enshrined in this declaration in opposing, when it was
made, the designs of the Holy Alliance, and in removing the
threat of a European reconquest of America, was, by a for-
tunate coincidence of principles, of very great service to us
at the beginning of our existence. We fully recognize that in
this sense the declaration has done and always will do great
honor to the United States, whose political history contains
so many fine pages with reference to freedom and justice.
It would be untrue-it is, in fact quite untrue-to give as
Article 21 gives, even by way of an example, the name
of regional agreement to a unilateral political declaration
which has never, as far as I am aware, been explicitly
approved by other American states."
Senor Cantilo, the author of this statement, was not correct in saying
"other American states" because it has been approved sometimes by
some of them.
Has this Monroe Doctrine, in any form, ever been recognized by
the American states as a general principle of American International
Law? Have any specific doctrines or rules been so recognized? These
are the questions which we must now answer.
(1) In illustrating the answer to our first query we have the
curious case of Chile, Bolivia and Peru. These nations found them-
selves in difficulties in one of the Assemblies of the League of Nations,
Bolivia having complained about the way Chile had or had not
applied the tenets of their treaty relating to peace. It is a curious
case because it is a case in which a South American state found it
convenient at the time to invoke the Monroe Doctrine in order to
get rid of an unpleasant discussion before the Assembly. Chile wrote
on September 3, 1921, to the Assembly refusing to have the question
dealt with in Geneva:
"The use, however, of the expression 'regional understand-
ings like the Monroe Doctrine,' in Article 21 of the Covenant,
amounts to a formal recognition of the principle of American
International Law, according to which the non-American
states, and consequently the Assembly, cannot interfere in
questions exclusively affecting countries of the New World."
In addition there are other cases wherein statesmen and publicists
of certain South American and Central American nations have pro-
1944]
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claimed their adherence to the principles, as they conceived them, of
the Monroe Doctrine. But there can be no doubt that a purely
unilateral declaration, as indeed it was, cannot be said to be a rule of
law when it is to be applied at the whim and in the particular interest
of the party acting.
(2) We have now to consider whether there have been recognized
any other specific doctrines or rules, between nations of the American
Hemisphere which could possibly be interpreted as a rule of American
International Law analogous to the Monroe Doctrine.
In the celebrated note of December 29, 1902, from Sr. Luis Drago,
minister of Foreign Affairs of the Argentine, to the Department of
State on the occasion of the joint intervention of Great Britain, Italy
and Germany against Venezuela, the Drago Doctrine was announced.
The argument led up to the recommendation of the proposed policy
intended to be a corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, that "The public
debt (of an American state) cannot occasion armed intervention, nor
even the actual occupation of the territory of American nations by a
European power.'
The Drago Doctrine, as it is known, is corollary in itself to this
other principle of American International Law known as the Calvo
Doctrine.
Whether from a lack of confidence in the local standards of justice
or from sheer arrogance, nationals of the United States and certain
European states notoriously refused to resort to local remedies in
Latin American countries during the 19th and early 20th centuries.
Hoping to retain the benefits of foreign capital while preventing fre-
quent diplomatic intervention on behalf of resident foreigners, the
Latin American states attempted by treaty, constitutional provision,
statute and contracts with aliens to secure observance of the rule that
aliens must resort to the local courts for settlement of their disputes.
These stipulations, developed from the writings of the celebrated Ar-
gentinian jurist, Carlos Calvo, and asserting "the final jurisdiction of
the local courts over the claims of aliens, with a denial of the right to
diplomatic recourse," have come to be known as the Calvo Doctrine. 8
While the Calvo clause and the Drago Doctrine have not been uni-
versally accepted by all international tribunals and publicists, still the
Central and South American states have unanimously regarded them
as settled principles of American International Law, with the acquies-
cence of the United States and most international tribunals to the
general proposition contained within those doctrines.9 Of the 27 cases
involving the Calvo clause, 11 have denied the validity of the clause
U. S. FOREIGN RELATIoNs (1903) pp. 1-5.
sBoRcARD, DIPLOMvrATIC PROTECTION, 792-93, for Calvo's statements.
1 U. S. North American Dredging Claim v. United Mex. States--Com-
mission 1926.
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and 16 have either upheld the clause as a bar to international reclama-
tion or have assumed that the clause might have some validity in cer-
tain cases (usually with the proviso that it would not prevent inter-
national commissions taking jurisdiction over claims for denial of
justice or some other violation of International Law.) 10
III. IN VIEw OF T E FOREGOING HISTORY, WE ARE NOW IN A
POSITION To ASK, IN WHAT DIRECTION MAY FUTURE
DEVELOPMENTS BE EXPECTED?
(1) Declaration of principles. In his inaugural address of 1933 Pres-
ident Franklin Roosevelt announced that the United States was hence-
forth to be governed by the policy of the "Good Neighbor." The first
legal step toward this new policy was the calling of the Montevideo
Conference in 1936 for the Maintenance of Peace. The Convention
on Rights and Duties of States there adopted provided that "no state
has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of an-
other." L Following the conference at Montevideo the United States
took further steps to apply the new treaty by the abrogation of the
Platt Amendment' - and the treaty with Panama removing restrictions
on its sovereignty imposed by the Treaty of 1903.- s
There followed the task of transforming the Monroe Doctrine from
a unilateral policy of the United States into a multipartite policy of
all the American Republics. This was first attempted in 1936 at the
Buenos Aires "Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of
Peace." A Brazilian proposal using phrases associated with the Mon-
roe Doctrine, proclaimed the interposition of a non-American power
in the affairs of an American state to be an unfriendly act, and pledged
the contracting parties immediately to consult with one another. The
reference in the draft to a non-American power was objected to by the
Argentine because it appeared to "imply a kind of Monroeism""1 with
the result that the phrase was generalized to state "in the event the
peace of the American Republics is menaced." 5 -Broad as was its
language the convention nevertheless affirmed the principle that the
American Republics had a common interest in the protection of any
one of their number against attack. The Additional Protocol supple-
menting Article 8 of the Montevideo Convention, not only declared
"inadvisable" the intervention of any one of the high contracting
parties "directly or indirectly, and for whatever reason, in the internal
or external affairs of any other of the parties," but went on to provide
that in the event of violation of the agreement there should be "mutual
"
0 See BORCHAID, 800-810; MooRa DIGEST, 293-309; FmLE, 185-200; Calvo
Clause 19 VA. L. REv. 459 (1933).
""Report of the Delegates, 165, 7.
'2 Treaty with Cuba, May 30, 1934.
13 Treaty of March 2, 1936.
It 31 AM. J. INT. L. (1937) 201, 203.
15 Report of the Delegates, 116.
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consultation" with the object of exchanging views and seeking methods
of peaceful adjustment., Here we see the adoption of the Calvo or
Drago principle by all of the twenty-one republics and the outlawing
of the principle of Roosevelt (Theodore) intervention.
It remained for the Eighth Inter-American Conference of American
States of 1938 at Lima to give greater definition to the principles ac-
cepted at Buenos Aires.
The United States now felt as if the warning of President Monroe
that we should consider as dangerous to our peace and safety any at-
tempt on the part of the European powers "to extend their system
to any portion of this hemisphere," had present application in the
efforts of the totalitarian states to undermine the domestic institutions
of the Latin-American Republics. The "second leg" of the doctrine as
Secretary Hull described it, was now at issue as well as the first, and
in the face of the challenge it was imperative that the American Re-
publics should stand together and proclaim their joint purpose to
resist internal as well as external threats to peace.
The Declaration of Lima must be taken both as a statement of prin-
ciples and as a pledge of action in regard to them. 7 The principles are
set forth in the preamble. It is there asserted that the spiritual unity
of the American Republics has been attained through (1) the simi-
larity of their republican institutions, (2) their unshakable will for
peace, (3) their profound sentiment of humanity and tolerance, and
(4) their absolute adherence to the principles of International Law, of
the equal sovereignty of states and of individual liberty without re-
ligious or racial prejudices.
The terms of the first and second articles of the Declaration are
broad, and they clearly include not only an armed attack by any non-
American power, but subversive propaganda and other forms of indi-
rect attack. The third article proclaims the "common concern" of the
governments of the American states and their "determination" to take
effective action in concert ("to make effective their solidarity"). The
states are to consult on a basis of absolute equals in sovereignty.
There is no doubt that the Declaration was the high point in the
development of the Monroe Doctrine into rules of American Public
International Law. Of course, it dealt with many matters that were
not capable of precise legal definition. But where it could be specific
it was and it went far beyond any mere attempt at a system of collec-
tive security. Certain domestic conditions have made a limited free-
dom of action essential in order that the common aim be attained, but
this common aim is present, clear, and impossible of misconstruction.
The Monroe Doctrine had now taken on a multilateral character.
20 Report of the Delegates, 124.
17 State Department Press Releases, Vol. XIX, pp. 494, 495, § 31 (1938).
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The principles remaining in it have been accepted by the whole body
of American Republics. The unilateral assertion by the United
States of the necessity of protecting the Western Hemisphere against
aggression from abroad was now the declaration of the hemisphere
itself (Canada excepted).
(2) Application to specific measures. With this collective neutrality
established it appeared that the machinery for consultation began to
move forward. Rumors of U-boat operations and other.talk of neu-
trality violation in this hemisphere were the common experience of
many Latin-American nations after the outbreak of war. There was no
doubt that these nations desired to work together.
(a) On September 6, 1939, Panama called a conference of the
governments of the American Republics. The decision of the final act
which received far the greatest amount of attention and aroused the
most controversy was the so-called Declaration of Panama. This
resolution was signed by the twenty-one American Republics establish-
ing the safety zone, defining its limits, and stating that the American
Republics "as of inherent right" were entitled to have the waters of
this area kept "free from the commission of any hostile act by any
non-American belligerent nation."' 8 That this declaration involved a
revision of what was formerly considered international law, that it
confused the "rights" of the belligerents and that apart from these
defects it was practically unenforceable, does not matter for the pres-
ent purpose. Suffice it to say that the multilateral character of the
American Public International Law had successfully passed through
its first test.
(b) On July 22, 1940, the Havana Conference of Foreign Ministries
of the American Governments was called. 19 The purpose of the Con-
ference was to discuss three sets of problems and conditions with
which the American states were then confronted, and in pursuance
of and under the machinery of the conferences of Buenos Aires, Lima
and Panama.
The first question related to the possible transfer of sovereignty at
any time over certain islands and regions from one non-American
state to another non-American state.
The second involved protective measures against the threat of sub-
versive activities in the American nations directed from outside the
continent.
The third comprised preparatory solutions for the extremely grave
economic difficulties and dislocations resulting from the war.
The Convention, in solving Question 1, decided that such a transfer
would not be permitted but that any islands so threatened with trans-
18 Department of State Bulletin, Vol. I, pp. 331-333, Oct. 7, 1939.19Department of State Bulletin, Vol. III, No. 61, pp. 127, 145, Aug. 24,
1940.
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fer were to be taken over and administered by an "Inter-American
Commission of Territorial Administration" leaving each nation free
to act independently in an emergency. This decision, it seems, is an
extension of the original Monroe Doctrine principle that no new
colonization would be permitted in the Western Hemisphere. Now,
however, it assumes the dignity of a rule of American Public Interna-
tional Law.
In solving Question 2 the nations represented decided to prevent and
suppress activities directed, assisted or abetted by foreign governments
or foreign groups or individuals which tend to subvert the domestic
institutions or to foment disorder in the internal political life of the
Americas. Immediate consultation is provided for in the event the
peace of any of the American Republics is menaced by such activities,
and for a full interchange of subversive information.
The decision to extend to the totalitarian powers the prohibition con-
tained in Monroe's original message against the spread of the monar-
chical systems of Europe and its multipartite adoption by the twenty-
one American Republics now found further development in this at-
tempt to curb the spread of European political doctrines by close
examination of the misuse of diplomatic and consular privilege by
those totalitarian powers.
This latter development is new, not only to the International Law
of the Western Hemisphere but to the International Law of the world.
In view of recent events little doubt can exist that the movement of
International Law in this direction is warranted by every circumstance
of new conditions of the times.
However, it is when we come to Question 3 and the economic field
that we find the most remarkable joint effort by the American states
to act in unison according to rules and procedures of their own choos-
ing. Very little, if any, of the ordinary classical International Law was
concerned with economics. The Habana Conference set up machinery
to arrange for the proper economic readjustment of the Western
Hemisphere in terms of a hemisphere economy.
In this connection particular attention was paid to the coffee surplus
of Brazil. An Inter-American Coffee Board was created to study the
situation and to make annual quota allotments on the amount of coffee
each exporting country could send to the United States. It was felt
that any serious loss of revenue, particularly in Brazil, might lead to
serious domestic difficulties which might prove inimical to continental
solidarity.
In the absence of this agreement, a totalitarian state might well have
it in its power to dictate terms to the coffee-producing states of this
hemisphere and might disorganize prices in the world market.
The full purpose of the Habana Conference was expressed by Sec-
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retary Hull, in the statement which he made on leaving Washington
to attend the Conference:
"A major purpose of the Habana meeting is full and free
consultation among the American Republics with respect to
the conditions, problems, difficulties, and dangers confronting
each of them. The complete exchange of information enables
each government thoroughly to understand the problems,
needs and viewpoints of the others. The ground will thus be
prepared for the adoption of basic and concrete measures
having common support for the common benefit of each and
all of the Republics." (Department of State Bulletin, July 20,
1940, Vol. III, No. 56, p. 34.)
(c) On January 28, 1942, the Third Conference of Foreign Ministers
was called in Rio de Janeiro as a result of a communication by the
Foreign Minister of Chile, Senor Rossetti, addressed to the Pan Ameri-
can Union, proposing that in view of the unjustified aggression against
the United States by a non-American power, and pursuant to Resolu-
tions XV and XVII adopted by the Habana Conference "a conference
be held to consider the situation that has arisen and to adopt the most
adequate measures demanded by the solidarity of our nations and the
defense of the hemisphere. -20
Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia united in presenting a project
(No. 21) calling for the breaking off of "political, commercial and
financial relations" with Germany, Italy and Japan. The proposed
resolution was in conformity with the principles of continental solidar-
ity accepted at Lima and Habana.2 1 Argentina and Chile refused to
accept the resolution in that form and it was rephrased to permit free-
dom of individual action.
The resolution, as adopted, reads:
"The American Republics, in accordance with the pro-
cedures established by their own laws and in conformity with
the position and circumstances obtaining in each country in
the existing international conflict, recommend the breaking
of their diplomatic relations with Japan, Germany and Italy
since the first mentioned state attacked and the other two de-
dared war on an American country."
Common consultation must first precede reestablishment of diplo-
matic relations once broken -.2 2 Since that resolution was passed, ,every
participating American state has either declared war on or broken off
relations with some or all of the Axis powers. 23
In excess of seventy-five prospective resolutions were presented and
considered by this conference, dealing with hemispheric economy,
20 TIRD MEETING OF THE MINISTERS OF FoREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE A1iuErICAN
RPFuBLcs; Special Handbook prepared by the Pan-American Union, p. 1.221 Dimno, No. 6, p. 11.
2Art. 4.
23 77 PAN-AwiucAN UNION BuLLmr.
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credit, commercial agreements,2" and, for the first time, the relations of
the inter-American regional system to the world organization for the
maintenance of peace.
Following the principles adopted at Habana and before, the con-
ferences established the "Inter-American Juridical Committee" for
the "consideration of measures which might be undertaken by the
American Republics now for the development of certain common ob-
jectives and plans which would contribute to the reconstruction of
world order.
25
IV. SUMMARY OF THE ACHIEVEMENTS
What are the premises of American Public International Law as
they stand today in the light of the foregoing conferences?
A multipartite agreement has been arrived at between twenty-one
American Republics to support each other in the defense of certain
formulated rules of international conduct, these rules to be operated
by a defined procedure acting not individually but for all (except in
stated cases of emergency when one may act alone, such action to be
ratified by all).
The rules of conduct so far established may be listed as follows: 26
(1) Joint defense of the Western Hemisphere from attack by any
power.
(2) Refusal to permit the transfer of any territory in the Western
Hemisphere owned by any non-American power to another non-Ameri-
can power.
(3) Refusal to permit the misuse of diplomatic and consular privi-
lege by certain European powers, the latter for spreading political
doctrines destructive of the democratic tradition of the Western Hem-
isphere.
(4) A plan to revise and readjust the economy of the Western Hem-
isphere as a unit with main regard for the welfare of the twenty-one
American Republics and their economic improvement by specific acts
as a unit in their commercial relations with each other and the world.
To these premises must be added the pre-existing Drago and Calvo
doctrines, but in qualified form, that no nation may collect or attempt
to collect any public debt from an American state by force of arms
or threat of force. Nor under the prevailing amicable spirit of the
"good neighbor" will any American state press diplomatically, the fi-
nancial claims of its subjects against any other American state without
just cause and without the citizen of the complaining state having first
24 1 DIARIO, No. 13, p. 6.
-5 THIRD MEETING OF THE MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE AIVIXRICAN
REPUBLICS; Programs and Regulations, Pan-American Union (1941).
26 The Marine Neutrality Zone created by the Declaration of Panama
has proven an empty gesture despite the efforts at a neutrality patrol
which have been made.
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exhausted all judicial remedies available to him under the law of the
state complained against.
V. PROSPECTIVE DEVELOPmENT
It seems clear that any prospective development of International
Law we can now conceive of must be deduced from the foregoing
generalizations. What are the deductions that we can make?
(1) Joint Defense of the Western Hemisphere. It seems certain that
steps must be taken jointly by the United States and the Latin-Ameri-
can nations should an attack be made on any one of them. This proposi-
tion logically27 leads the twenty-one American states to war if any one
of them are attacked by a non-American power. This proposition does
not lose its force because some of the American nations have not fol-
lowed the U. S. A. to war. Rather the strength of the agreement is
shown by the surprising unanimity. It will no longer be the sole respon-
sibility of the United States to decide whether or not its interests are
affected. Any majority action by the twenty-one Republics in confer-
ence or otherwise declaring that a state of war exists between them-
selves and a non-American power through the aggressive action of that
power must, under the rules laid down, lead to a UiWited States declar-
ation of war.
Towards this aim of self-defense the parties will undoubtedly es-
tablish joint military and naval bases at strategic points all over the
Western Hemisphere irrespective of the territorial sovereignty wherein
they may be placed. To a certain extent this has already been done.28
This indeed will be a new and startling development in the law of
nations in the light of our "New Monroe Doctrine" and may well lead
to a fundamental alteration of the notion of sovereignty.
(2) Refusal to permit any transfer of territory from one non-Ameri-
can power to another non-American power. This is clearly a rule new
to international law of any kind. It is distinctly concerned only with
the Western Hemisphere and is a proposition which must be marked
as characteristic of this new development of American Public Inter-
national Law.
What obligations will the enforcement of this rule impose on the
United States of America and the other twenty American states?
Prior to our entry into the war, the United States Navy maintained
a virtual blockade of the French Island of Martinique, ostensibly to
prevent transfer of that island or its naval and military possessions. It
seemed clear that any attempt to transfer possessions or control of
that island to Germany or some other non-American power would
have required the resistance of the United States fleet.
-- Although probably not "legally."
-Reasons of military security do not permit a listing of American
bases on Latin-American soil.
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Although the rule has been laid down in general terms, i. e., all parties
signatory to the Habana Conference are to consult concerning the pre-
vention of any proposed violation, freedom of individual action was
intentionally retained so that any individual state capable of immedi-
ate and effective resistance could prevent a quick attempt at military
seizure. Of course this means that the United States is charged with
the primary duty of preventing any such transfer with such aid as the
other republics can give to be forthcoming at such times and in such
amounts as their limited resources permit.
The committee named to govern such territories, which are to be
taken and administered in the name of the twenty-one American
Republics, will undoubtedly govern such territories according to the
general spirit of Western Hemisphere government as it is described
in the Final Act of the Buenos Aires Convention, i. e., democratic in
form with the traditional freedoms of speech, assembly, worship, and
press.
In the event that the European nations who during the course of
this war have lost certain of their American possessions, are finally
victorious, it would seem to follow that such territory in the possession
and under the control of the Inter-American Committee would per-
force be transferred back to their original owners.
(3) Refusal to permit the misuse of diplomatic and consular privi-
leges by European powers so that they might more easily spread their
political doctrine. This would mean that the American Republics are
prepared jointly at some not too distant future to reformulate the
proper limits of diplomatic and consular privileges and to lay down
strict rules concerning the conduct and the size of such diplomatic and
consular staffs within their territorial boundaries.
Following this, any member of any diplomatic or consular staff in
any American state who would be ousted from that state for subversive
activities in violation of the "hemisphere rule" would automatically be
refused admission as a diplomat, agent or consul or possibly as a
private citizen by the remaining American states.
Close examination, observation and registration of all European
agents, diplomats, consuls, commercial attaches and, as stated above,
even citizens, would be maintained by means of a joint committee
of the American states and close and frequent transfers of information
between the various states.
(4) An attempt to revise and readjust the economy of the Western
Hemisphere as a unit, self-sustaining as far as possible, with main
regard for the welfare of the twenty-one American states and their
economic improvement by means of specific acts in their commercial
relations with one another and the world. Following the Hemisphere
Coffee Agreement there seems great probability that new conferences
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will lead to even greater economic cooperation between the American
states. Rules of economic' conduct on a par with rules of political
conduct will undoubtedly be formulated and a violation of such an
economic rule of international law will cause the application of such
sanctions as might usually be applied.
The object of course is the economic independence of the Western
Hemisphere so as to improve the political position of the weaker states
of the hemisphere. Any act or series of acts which tend toward this
aim may well be expected by the joint action of the group and the
action of one state of the group assisting other members of the group.
The twenty-one American Republics29 aim at a politically, socially
and economically unified hemisphere immune from attack either eco-
nomically, politically or by military action. They aim at a unified
hemisphere governed by multipartite agreements resulting from dis-
cussions and free debate between the twenty-one states as equals.
They aim at the enunciation of certain rules of political, social and
economic conduct to which we have given the name of the "New Mon-
roe Doctrine" or the rules of "American Public International Law."
Toward these aims they must of necessity join forces in all three
fields, and they must establish a permanent organization including a
court of justice with power to settle disputes among themselves.
It is still too early to tell whether the framework of the new world
organization outlined at the recent Dumbarton Oaks conference will
include regional agreements of the type referred to above. If we are to
take the Covenant of the League of Nations as a guile (Article 21) the
United Nations agreement will specifically acknowledge such regional
understandings. But whether our world organization recognizes the
"New Monroe Doctrine" or not, the economic, geographic, and politi-
cal forces which have given rise to this solidarity of the 21 American
Republics will not be stayed. Regional understandings may or may
not be inimical to the successful functioning of a world organization
but unless the world organization is able to completely satisfy the
needs of and enforce its decisions on all the republics of the Western
Hemisphere the growth of a strong regional system seems certain.
21 The present position of Argentina is not regarded as significant. The
successful conclusion of the war in Europe and the Pacific will undoubt-
edly result in the reestablishment of a truly democratic regime or a
regime sympathetic to democratic ideals and pledged to "continental
solidarity."
